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ABSTRACT
In recent years there has been a major push by the power industry to uti-
lize phasor measurement units (PMUs) for wide area monitoring and con-
trol. PMUs are considered to be one of the most critical technologies for
the future and modernization of the power grid. This technology produces
time-stamped voltage and current phasor measurements, allowing measure-
ments from any point in the power infrastructure to be synchronized. Widely
regarded as one of the most vital devices in monitoring and control for the
future of power systems, PMUs rely on the Global Positioning System (GPS)
to provide the absolute time reference necessary to synchronize phasor mea-
surements. The security and reliability of PMUs are essential to the future
of the power grid and so in this work we aim to provide robust GPS timing
for PMUs.
Since power systems are considered part of the civil sector, PMUs must
utilize the civil GPS signals to obtain the time reference. However, the low
received signal strength and unencrypted nature of the civil GPS signal leaves
PMU reliability susceptible to both non-malicious and malicious interference.
Most notably, jamming and spoofing attacks on PMU GPS receivers can pose
a risk to the position, velocity, and timing (PVT) solutions.
Our goals are to provide robust GPS time transfer for PMUs and to rapidly
detect malicious spoofing attacks. We achieve these goals by leveraging the
inherent properties of PMU GPS receivers. We propose and implement the
position-information-aided (PIA) vector tracking loop and the multi-receiver
PIA vector tracking loop. To evaluate the effectiveness of the algorithms
presented in this thesis, we also conduct field experiments which showed
improve tracking capabilities and continued operation through various at-
tacks of both algorithms. Our experiments show that the proposed PIA and
multi-receiver PIA vector tracking approaches 1) improve the robustness of
GPS receivers used in PMUs against jamming and interference; 2) are ro-
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bust against spoofing attacks; and 3) can detect various spoofing attacks.
Finally, we conducted tests using a real-time digital simulator (RTDS) which
demonstrate the impacts of an attack on a PMU’s time source.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Global Positioning System Background
The Global Positioning System (GPS) was developed by the United States
Air Force in the early 1970s, at the height of the Cold War, as a means
to quickly determine the location of military assets. In 1978, the first GPS
Block-I satellite was launched and 15 years later, 1993, GPS achieved initial
operational capability with a constellation of 24 satellites in Medium Earth
Orbit. While GPS was originally developed for U.S. military use only, after
a tragedy in 1983 where a civilian airplane carrying 269 passengers was shot
down after accidentally entering Soviet airspace, President Ronald Reagan
issued a directive that allowed unrestricted global access to GPS technology
once the system was operational.
When the GPS system was proposed, the U.S. military predicted that upon
completion GPS could potentially have tens of thousands of users. Today,
GPS has evolved into an indispensable infrastructure with billions of receivers
world-wide. Many critical sectors such as energy, finance, transportation,
and communications are increasingly reliant on positioning, navigation, and
timing (PNT) services provided by GPS. This thesis will focus on the use of
GPS in the energy sector, the vulnerabilities GPS introduces, and a novel
tracking method to mitigate potential vulnerabilities.
1.2 Phasor Measurement Unit Introduction
The generation, transmission, and distribution of electrical power over wide
area is accomplished through the use of an interconnected infrastructure
known as the power grid. Many industrialized countries have recognize the
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necessity of power grid security and advancement on a national scale. In
the United States, a presidential policy directive (PPD-21) identifies the
power grid as an critical infrastructure and executed a policy that aims to
strengthen and secure the power grid [1]. The last two decades have shown
that the power grid is vulnerable to intentional, unintentional, and natu-
ral disruptions. While past disruptions have merely resulted in small-scale
losses, the power community has recognized the necessity for a more resilient
infrastructure. In an effort to increase the resiliency and response time of
power systems, new physical and cyber infrastructure, also known as the
“smart grid,” is in the process of being installed. One of the most important
components of the smart grid infrastructure is the phasor measurement unit
(PMU), which is a device that allows for synchronous phasor measurements
by using GPS to supply a time reference.
Current power systems employ the supervisory control and data acqui-
sition (SCADA) system for the purposes of collecting and monitoring the
electrical wave observations in the power grid. This system operates with-
out the use of an external time reference but has also been proven to have
limited robustness and significant delayed event detection times. In SCADA,
the state of the power grid is estimated using legacy sensors and transmitted
to control stations via a communication system; the state information is then
used in making decisions on the operation of the power grid [2]. The SCADA
system generally polls for information from remote sites once every few sec-
onds for critical systems and up to a few minutes for non-critical systems [3];
however, due to transmission delays and the asynchronous nature of the wave
measurement tools, the information displayed by SCADA is delayed and out
of phase. During typical steady-state conditions, delays in measurement are
not of major concern. However, during system disturbances the information
collected by SCADA does not accurately represent the system and the states
cannot be precisely estimated [4].
While the current power grid relies on SCADA, the upcoming smart grid
requires significantly improved state estimations and sampling rates. PMUs,
also known as synchrophasors, are devices that provide precise electrical wave
measurements at frequencies up to 60 Hz. The high speed measurements
generated by PMUs are capable of providing the control stations with in-
formation at subsecond time frames, allowing dynamic state measurements
of the power system. Additionally, since PMUs across the country use the
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Figure 1.1: Disturbance in the power grid: SCADA and PMU comparison
[5]. SCADA measurements show a significant delayed detection time
compared with PMU measurements.
GPS system as a common time source, the phasor measurements collected by
individual units can be placed onto the same phasor diagram without regard
to distance or transmission times. This information allows for fine-tuning of
the power system that was previously unattainable using the SCADA sys-
tem. The near real-time measurements collected by PMUs would allow for
adaptive and robust state adjustments to account for any changes in the
system.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the difference between measurements collected by
the SCADA system and a PMU during disturbance in a power grid in Ok-
lahoma [5]. For this disturbance, the SCADA system displayed a delayed
detection time of around 30 seconds and only updates the states once every
few minutes. These numbers may change depending on the system and the
collection points but even the most ideal SCADA system can only collect a
single sample in the time a PMU can collect hundreds. Figure 1.2 simplifies
the basic operations of a PMU in the power grid.
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Figure 1.2: The basic operation of a PMU. By time-stamping
measurements to GPS time, we can effectively synchronize phasor
measurements among any set of PMUs.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
In this chapter we discuss the background behind PMUs, a few fundamental
concepts of GPS, and GPS vulnerabilities specific to PMUs.
2.1 PMU Applications
The concept of PMUs was first developed in 1988 by Dr. Arun G. Phadke
and Dr. James S. Throp at Virginia Tech; PMUs were designed to pro-
duce time-stamped phasor measurements of AC waveforms at rates up to 60
samples per second [6]. While this technology has been around for nearly
three decades, PMU usage has only skyrocketed in the last few years when
the U.S. Department of Energy committed a sizable amount towards the
development of the smart grid in 2009. In 2010, the North American Syn-
chroPhasor Initiative (NASPI) estimated that there were around 200 PMUs
spread across the United States and Canada, the majority being research-
grade units [7]. By 2012, that number had increased to 500 [5]; and by the
end of 2014, NASPI estimated that there were over 1,700 production grade
PMUs deployed across the U.S. and Canada [7]. This network now provides
near 100-percent visibility of the major power systems and many companies
have already begun to integrate PMU measurements into their monitoring
systems.
PMUs are generally installed at critical substations, strategically placed
such that the states of an entire area can be monitored for shifts in grid sta-
bility at any time. Since PMU measurements are synchronized to a common
time reference, absolute comparisons between PMU measurements are pos-
sible allowing system operators to accurately assess system conditions and
make control decisions [8, 9].
There are many benefits to utilizing PMUs, a few are listed below.
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1. Automatic control: This includes, for example, balancing supply and
demand in the power grid. Due to safety concerns, current transmission
lines operate under the worst-case limit which restricts power flow far
beneath the ideal dynamic limit. PMU technology has the potential
to change the economics of power delivery by automatically balancing
supply to demand, allowing power to flow up to the line’s dynamic limit
instead of its worst-case limit [10].
2. Fault detection: In 2003, a widespread blackout in the Northeast U.S.
illustrated how PMU technology could have been used to detect and
mitigate the effects of the blackout [11].
3. Wide area monitoring and analysis: WAM can reveal patterns, trends,
and abnormalities in the power system.
4. Event analysis: Post-event analysis will benefit significantly from the
data gathered by PMUs.
In North America alone there are currently over a thousand PMUs net-
worked into the power grid. However, the measurements collected by these
PMUs have yet to replace those of the SCADA system in their roles for au-
tomatic control of the power systems. This is largely due to the fact that
PMUs are not yet secure devices given their dependence on GPS. It has been
demonstrated that attacks on PMUs can induce timing errors leading to the
destabilizing or unnecessary control responses from an automated system [4].
2.2 Global Positioning System
The Global Positioning System is designed as a satellite-based radio navi-
gation system that provides position, velocity, and time (PVT) information
to any GPS receiver given that the signals from four or more satellites are
received. GPS utilizes a network of 24 to 32 satellites orbiting the Earth
twice a day at approximately 20,200 km above the surface of the earth. Each
satellite is equipped with multiple network-synchronized atomic clocks, en-
abling a user receiver to effectively synchronize to the satellites’ atomic clocks
for near atomic accuracy, without the cost of owning an atomic clock. Each
GPS satellite continuously broadcasts several signals at various frequencies.
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For the purposes of this thesis, we will only discuss the signals broadcast
at the GPS L1 frequency (1575.42 MHz). GPS signals are transmitted at
a power equivalent to a 50 watt light bulb and by the time they reach a
GPS receiver on the Earth’s surface, the GPS signals are buried beneath the
thermal noise floor. Fortunately, GPS signals can still be decoded due to
the pseudo-random noise (PRN) codes that the satellites use. Each satel-
lite transmits two unique spread spectrum pseudo-random ranging signals: a
civil Coarse/Acquisition (C/A) code and a Precision encrypted (P(Y)) code.
The C/A code is unencrypted and readily available to the public whereas
the P(Y) code is reserved for military use. Navigation messages are further
modulated onto the signals which, once decoded, are used to calculate the
satellite positions and the satellite clock bias [12].
Once the pseudorange, satellite positions, and satellite clock biases are
known we use basic trilateration to determine the user location:
ρ(i)r =
√
(x
(i)
s − xr)2 + (y(i)s − yr)2 + (z(i)s − zr)2
+c(br − b(i)s ) + (i)
where x
(i)
s is the position of the ith satellite, xr is the position of the user
receiver, ρ
(i)
r is the pseudorange between the user receiver and the ith satellite,
br is the receiver clock bias, b
(i)
s is the satellite clock bias, and (i) is the range
measurement error. Given that we have 4 or more satellites, the unknowns
(xr, yr, zr, and br) can be solved for by minimizing 
(i).
2.2.1 GPS Vulnerabilities Affect PMUs
As with all GPS dependent systems, GPS vulnerabilities are included in PMU
vulnerabilities. Other PMU vulnerabilities include physical and cyber vul-
nerabilities. However, both the physical security and cyber security aspects
of PMUs are more readily dealt with since cyber security flaws can quickly be
patched and physical security is easily upgraded. GPS vulnerabilities, on the
other hand, are much more difficult to mitigate since GPS satellite-receiver
communication only flows one way and the structures of GPS civil signals
are readily available for public use. As a result, PMU reliability is limited
by GPS reliability.
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The weak signal strength and unencrypted nature of the civil GPS signals
leave receivers at risk for unintentional interference, jamming [13, 14], and
spoofing attacks [15, 16, 17]. Each of these threats can potentially alter the
position and time solutions generated by the receivers.
Threats to PMUs considered in this thesis:
1. Unintentional interference: There are many sources of unintentional
interference to GPS signals. In recent years, the GPS community was
engaged in a struggle in order to prevent high-powered radio signals
from being broadcast near the GPS L1 frequency [18]. While the high-
powered signals would only be broadcast in their allocated band, stud-
ies on the subject revealed that the low-powered GPS signals would be
overwhelmed by the high-powered signals, forcing millions of existing
GPS users to upgrade their devices or accept degraded service [19].
Unintentional interference can also come from naturally occurring elec-
tromagnetic (EM) fields [20, 21] and solar flares [22]; and even common
electronic devices have been reported to produce interference.
2. Jamming: In a jamming attack, a jammer transmits high-powered sig-
nals in the GPS frequency band which effectively raises the noise floor
and prevents a user receiver from acquiring and tracking the GPS sig-
nal. Due to its simplicity, a jamming attacks is perhaps the most
common attack faced by GPS receivers.
3. Spoofing: Since the structure of the civil GPS signals is publicly known,
a spoofer can generate falsified GPS signals in order to mislead the
target receiver as shown in Figure 2.1. There are many types of spoofing
attacks [23, 16]; in this thesis we will focus on meaconing attacks,
also known as bent-pipe spoofing and record-and-replay attacks. A
spoofer employing meaconing attacks records authentic GPS signals
in one location and rebroadcasts (with a delay τ) them towards the
target receiver. The navigation processing of a receiver affected by a
meaconing attack will produce a PVT solution with the position of the
spoofer’s recording antenna and a time solution that is delayed by tau.
PMU-based control of the power grid is being pushed for by both the power
industry and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) [5]. Reli-
able PMU measurements can pave the way to efficient energy distribution,
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Figure 2.1: A spoofing attack in progress. In the first frame, the tracking
loop is locked onto the legitimate GPS signal. In the second frame, the
spoofer matches the amplitude of the legitimate GPS signal. In the third
frame, the legitimate signal and the spoofed signal overlap. In the 4th
frame the tracking loop locks onto the spoofed signal. In the 5th frame, the
spoofed signal draws the tracking loop away from the legitimate signal,
successfully spoofing the signal. [15]
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Figure 2.2: Two phasor measurement units from the TCIPG testbed at
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
increase grid resistance and robustness to disturbances, and increase event
response times. However, the security and stability of the power grid su-
persedes the improved efficiency and control. The security risks introduced
by utilizing GPS-based devices prevent PMUs from being fully integrated
into the power system. Since we aim to provide robust GPS-based timing to
PMUs, our goals are to:
1. Improve PMU GPS receiver robustness against interference and jam-
ming attacks.
2. Increase receiver robustness against spoofing attacks.
3. Detect spoofing attacks.
2.3 Our Testbed
To fully understand the real-life impacts of a spoofed or jammed GPS sig-
nal on the PMU, and by extension the power grid, we must be able to
test its effects in a controlled environment. At the University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, the Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power
Grid (TCIPG) has built a testbed specifically for emulating large-scale power
systems using high-end simulation equipment. The testbed currently con-
tains 10 PMUs, two of which are shown in Figure 2.2, which are used to
control and monitor high fidelity simulations and equipment such as the real-
time digital simulator (RTDS) shown in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: A real-time digital simulator of power systems at the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The RTDS is capable of simulating
large-scale power systems in order to test the effects of disturbances on the
power grid.
2.4 Contents of this Thesis
The remainder of this thesis discusses a novel type of tracking loop, the
PIA vector tracking loop, our approach to implementing the algorithm, and
results from field tests designed to test the PIA vector tracking loop. Then
another chapter will discuss the multi-receiver PIA vector tracking loop and
test results from this algorithm. Finally, we will present the test results from
our RTDS simulations and give the conclusions.
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CHAPTER 3
POSITION-INFORMATION-AIDED
VECTOR TRACKING
3.1 Concepts of PIA Vector Tracking
In order to accomplish the goals set, we proposed and implemented the
Position-Information-Aided (PIA) vector tracking loop which utilizes the
static nature of the GPS receivers used in PMUs to enhance tracking perfor-
mance. The concept of the PIA vector tracking loop was first developed by
Heng et al. [24]. The basic idea behind the PIA vector tracking loop is that
by leveraging the knowledge of the true position of GPS receivers used in
PMUs, we can accurately predict the code and carrier measurements used in
tracking the signal. By projecting the relative position and velocity between
satellites and the receiver on the line-of-sight (LOS) direction, the tracking
parameters can be precisely estimated. This type of receiver architecture is a
subset of the vector tracking architecture which has been shown to increase
immunity to interference and jamming [25, 26, 27]. Vector tracking combines
signal tracking and position/velocity estimation into one algorithm, allowing
information from one channel to aid in the tracking of another. The main
downside to vector tracking is the high computation time required; however,
for the purposes of this work, processing power is not of major concern.
Tracking robustness is also improved through the use of Kalman filtering
and since the receivers in a PMU must remain static, the parameters of the
tracking loops can be adaptively chosen to narrow the loop filter bandwidth.
The narrowband tracking loop limits receiver noise, which reduces the effec-
tive radius of any jamming attacks. Additionally, the PIA vector tracking
approach allows for a natural defense against meaconing attacks. Since the
PIA vector tracking approach is dependent on the true position of the GPS
receiver, the proposed tracking loop will fail to converge in the case of a
meaconing attack, therefore enabling the detection of meaconing.
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Figure 3.1: Scalar tracking architecture. The incoming signal is processed
by N independent tracking loops, where N is the number of visible
satellites.
3.2 Background on Traditional Tracking Methods
3.2.1 Scalar Tracking
Tracking loops are among the most critical components of a GPS receiver.
These loops process received signals with an ultimate goal of a position,
velocity and time (PVT) solution. However, the code and carrier tracking
loops are vulnerable to low signal-to-noise ratio and high dynamics [28].
Based on the principles of calculating navigation solutions, at least 4 satellites
are needed to provide 3-dimensional positions and clock bias [24]. Therefore,
when the number of available satellites drops below 4 due to interference or
blockage, the receiver will fail to navigate.
In a traditional GPS receiver, tracking loops work independently [25]. The
inherent connections based on the same user position and velocities between
channels are neglected [26]. Thus, there is no information exchange between
channels, which makes it impossible for channels with strong signals to aid
those with weak signals. Figure 3.1 shows the scalar architecture and Figure
3.2 breaks down the operation of the scalar tracking loop.
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Figure 3.2: Simplified scalar tracking loop operation. In scalar tracking, the
GPS signal is collected by the front end and used to generate correlations
with the replicas from the NCO. The correlations are used to calculate the
discriminators, which are then used to derive the next Doppler and phase
estimates.
3.2.2 Vector Tracking
The concept behind vector tracking loops was first introduced by Spilker
in 1996 [29]. While scalar loops function independently for all channels, a
vector tracking loop simultaneously processes signals from all channels and
calculates navigation solutions based on the code and carrier measurements.
Vector tracking enhances performance by enabling information to be ex-
changed between channels, which enables channels with strong signals to aid
those with weak signals [25]. Current PMU GPS receivers employ traditional
scalar tracking loops for the purposes of a PVT solution [23]. However, scalar
tracking loops neglect the inherent relations between each channel and the
same static PMU receiver position. Figure 3.3 shows the basic architecture
of a standard scalar tracking loop.
3.3 Architecture and Overall Flow
The structure of the PIA vector tracking loop is shown in Figure 3.4. In PIA
vector tracking, information from the navigation filter and the known true
position is fed back into the tracking loop and used to control the numerically
controlled oscillator (NCO). As a result, the channels share information with
14
Figure 3.3: Vector tracking architecture. All of the channels are linked by
the same user position, velocity, and time solutions. By feeding back the
PVT solution into the tracking loop, the vector tracking architecture can
improve tracking results.
one another and are able to aid channels with weak signal-to-noise ratios
through the use of a common static receivers position, velocity, and clock
bias.
In comparison to our PIA vector tracking approach, traditional scalar
tracking processes each channel independently, and there is no feedback of
information between the navigation filter and the tracking loops. As such,
scalar tracking neglects to take into account the relations between satellites
and the user position and velocity. By leveraging this information in our PIA
vector tracking algorithm, the search space is narrowed considerably in the
(x,y,z) dimensions.
In implementing the position-information-aided vector tracking algorithm,
we actively drew on the previous vector tracking research completed by Zhao
and Akos [26] as well as the open source MATLAB SDR code created by
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Figure 3.4: Position-Information-Aided vector tracking loop operation. By
assisting the tracking loop with the known location, the PMU GPS receiver
increases its robustness against interference.
Borre et al. [30]. The open source vector tracking code designed by Zhao and
Akos was designed to operate under high dynamics and low signal-to-noise
environments. For the purposes of implementing the PIA vector tracking,
we have extensively modified the existing vector tracking code for operation
under no dynamics and low signal-to-noise situations.
PIA vector tracking loops are meant to be used in conjunction with the
existing scalar loops. At a specific time epoch, the following are extracted
from the scalar tracking results and used to initialize the PIA vector tracking
loop: code phase (φj,k), code frequency (fcode,j,k), carrier frequency (fj,k),
signal transmit time (ttrans,j,k), clock bias (tb,k), and clock drift (td,k). The
subscript j represents the jth satellite and k represents the kth epoch. Since
the PIA vector tracking is loosely dependent on these initial values, we choose
to initialize our tracking loop after the scalar loop has gained a strong fix on
the signal.
After initialization, the PIA vector tracking loop first predicts the navi-
gation solution and errors for the next time epoch. Then early, late, and
prompt code replicas are generated using the LOS projections to calculate
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the predicted Doppler and phase terms. The code replicas are then used
to create correlations with the signal from the GPS front end which is then
used generate the code and carrier discriminators. The discriminators from
each channel contain the code and carrier errors, which are then projected
onto the LOS vectors and used to generate the Kalman filter measurement
matrix. The Kalman filter then estimates the new errors and, based on the
updated errors, we can estimate the new navigation solution and create a
prediction for the next time epoch. Since we know the true position of the
GPS receiver, we then correct the prediction and create a closed feedback
loop using the corrected predictions.
3.4 Detailed Flow
The process for the PIA vector tracking algorithm can be broken down into
4 main groups: 1. Estimation of the NCO parameters, 2. Discriminator
calculation and processing, 3. Navigation error estimation and navigation
prediction, 4. Navigation correction and error correction using the true po-
sition and feedback. In the next section, we will discuss each of these groups
in greater detail.
3.4.1 Estimation of the NCO Parameters
The NCO uses carrier frequency and phase estimates to generate code replicas
used for correlation. Since the carrier frequency and phase terms are directly
influenced by the geometry and movement of the satellites with respect to
the PMU GPS receiver, we simply need to use the satellite positions and
velocities to estimate these terms.
We assume that the ephemeris values are known from either scalar tracking
results or external sources. Then the satellite positions from the kth epoch
can be generated and the satellite positions and velocities are then used to
estimate the pseudorange, the LOS unit vector, and find the relative velocity
between the satellite and the PMU receiver. The code phase and carrier
frequencies can then be calculated based on the previous estimated terms.
The true position of the receiver is assumed to be known, and therefore the
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predicted position and velocity are given by the following equations:
Xˆk+1 = Xtrue (3.1)
Vˆk+1 = Vtrue (3.2)
where Xtrue is the PMU receiver position and Vtrue is the PMU receiver veloc-
ity. We denote position and velocity predictions for the next time epoch as
Xˆk+1 and Vˆk+1. Once the position and velocity projections are calculated the
code phase/frequency, carrier frequency, and clock drift prediction equations
are given in equations 5-8 of Zhao and Akos [26].
From the estimated code phase and carrier frequencies, replicas of the code
are generated and used to create correlations with the received GPS signal
at the corresponding time epoch.
3.4.2 Discriminator Calculation and Processing
The NCO generates early, prompt, and late replicas which are used to create
correlations with the incoming signals. We will denote the in-phase early,
prompt, and late correlations as IE, IP , and IL. Similarly, quadrature corre-
lations will be denoted as QE, QP , and QL.
In this work, we chose to only use carrier frequency discriminators since
carrier phase tracking is not suited for low signal-to-noise environments, as
is the case during interference or jamming attacks.
For the code phase discriminator, we chose to use:
1
2
E − L
E + L
where
E =
√
I2E +Q
2
E and L =
√
I2L +Q
2
L
This discriminator, described in [31], is a noncoherent early minus late
envelope normalized by E+L to remove amplitude sensitivity.
We chose to use a normalized decision directed frequency discriminator as
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described in table 5.4 of [31]:
(cross)× sign(dot)
2pi(t2 − t1)(I2P2 +Q2P2)
where
cross = IP1QP2 − IP2QP2
dot = IP1IP2 −QP2QP2
and the P1 and P2 subscripts represent the results over current epoch and
the previous epoch. The discriminator outputs are then used to generate the
Kalman filter measurement matrix.
3.4.3 Navigation Error Estimation and Navigation Prediction
The discriminators output the code phase errors and carrier frequency errors
which contain the corresponding LOS projections of the discrepancies be-
tween the estimated position and velocity and the known true position and
velocity. The relationship between the code phase error and carrier frequency
errors with the user position error can be modeled as:
ecode,k = φˆj,k − φj,k (3.3)
ecarr,k = fˆj,k − fj,k (3.4)
where ecode and φ are in meters, and ecarr, and f are in meters/sec. By
using the calculated LOS projections (aj,k), we can rewrite (3.3) and (3.4) as
functions of the clock bias and change in clock drift:
ecode,k = tb,k + (Xk − Xˆk)Taj,k (3.5)
ecarr,k = ∆td,k + (Vk − Vˆk)Taj,k (3.6)
The position and velocity errors can be modeled as the difference between
the true PMU receiver position and the calculated position and velocity:
δXk = Xtrue −Xk (3.7)
δVk = Xtrue − Vk (3.8)
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In each of the equations above, there is an implied error term that has not
been included.
We can see from the error analysis that, if the position and velocity errors
can be estimated, the navigation solution can also be calculated. Therefore in
implementing the PIA vector tracking, we chose the position errors, velocity
errors, clock bias error, and clock drift error as the states of the Kalman filter.
Since we know the initial position, velocity, clock bias, and clock drift values
from the scalar tracking results, the navigation solution can be estimated
through the errors.
Then δX, δV , δtb, and δtd are the states of our system and the discrete
process equation is given by
δXk+1
δVk+1
δtb,k+1
δtd,k+1
 = Fk,k+1

δXk
δVk
δtb,k
δtd,k
 (3.9)
where
Fk,k+1 =

0 ∆t 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ∆t
0 0 0 0

where ∆t is given by the time difference between the kth and k + 1 time
epoch. The Kalman filter measurement equation is then given in equation
10 of Zhao and Akos [26]:
Zk =HXk + Vk
=[zcode,1,k zcarrier,1,k ... zcode,n,k zcarrier,n,k]
T
1×2n
where the terms of the H matrix are determined by the following equations:
zcode,j,k = aj,kδX + tb,k
zcarrier,j,k = aj,kδV + ∆td,k
where ∆td,k is the change in the clock drift error.
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Since the states of the Kalman filter were chosen to be error of the position,
velocity, clock bias, and clock drift, we can then correct our predictions as:
Xk+1 = Xˆk+1 + δXk+1 (3.10)
= Xtrue + δXk+1
Vk+1 = Vˆk+1 + δVk+1 (3.11)
= Vtrue + δVk+1
tb,k+1 = tˆb,k+1 + δtb,k+1 (3.12)
td,k+1 = tˆd,k+1 + δtd,k+1 (3.13)
where the ‘hat’ indicates the predictions from the previous time epoch. The
corrected predictions shown here are then output as our navigation solutions.
In the PIA vector tracking loop, the bandwidth is controlled by the Kalman
filter, which makes it difficult to pinpoint the exact bandwidth that is being
used as the adaptive Kalman filter gain, K, is proportional to the band-
width. Thus, in this work, the bandwidth was set empirically by controlling
the Kalman filter Q and R matrices which represent the uncertainty in the
dynamics of the user and the noise in the discriminator outputs. More de-
tailed explanations can be found in [26]. However, to compare the scalar and
PIA vector tracking results, the tracking loop bandwidths should be rela-
tively similar. Therefore, we empirically adjusted the Q and R matrices such
that the basic vector tracking loop’s performance closely matched that of the
scalar tracking loop using a 5 Hz bandwidth, due to the receiver being static,
and we used the same Q and R values in our P.I.A vector tracking loop.
3.4.4 Navigation Correction and Error Correction Using the
True Position and Feedback
Once the position and velocity predictions have been corrected by the Kalman
filter, we then compare the corrected predictions with our known true posi-
tion and velocity. By taking into account the true position, we can estimate
the errors for the next time epoch using (3.7) and (3.8) and feed back the
predicted errors into the tracking loop to form a closed loop.
Then the code frequency, code phase, and carrier frequency can be cor-
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rected as:
fcode,j,k+1 = fˆcode,j,k+1
+ (td,k+1 + δVk+1aj,k)
fcode/c (3.14)
φj,k+1 = φˆj,k+1 + δX
T
k+1aj,k + tb,k (3.15)
fcarrier,j,k+1 = fˆcarrier,j,k+1
+ (td,k+1 + δVk+1aj,k)
fcarrier/c (3.16)
3.4.5 Calculating GPS Receiver Clock Bias
Since we know the true position of the receiver, we can accurately calculate
the clock bias of the receiver as a weighted average of the difference between
the calculated pseudorange and actual range. Equation 4.7 from Heng [32]:
tb =
1∑J
j=1 ωj
J∑
j=1
ωj(ρ˜
(j) − |x(j) − x|) (3.17)
3.5 Experimental Setup and Results
In order to determine the performance of the PIA vector tracking algorithm
compared with the traditional tracking algorithm, we conducted field tests
using an off-the-shelf GPS receiver. For the receiver, we chose the SiGe GN3S
GPS sampler, which is essentially an A/D converter with a bandpass filter,
to collect raw GPS signals. The SiGe front-end is a thumb-sized USB device
designed to operate in conjunction with a software-defined receiver (SDR),
shown in Figure 3.5. It uses a sampling frequency from 4 MHz to 16 MHz
and a quantization resolution of 2 bits. Since the quality of the GPS receivers
used in PMUs is generally higher than that of a SiGe sampler, the results we
obtain using data collected with the low-cost SiGe will provide a conservative
lower-bound estimate of results collected using PMU receivers.
The antenna used in this experiment was a fixed-reference choke ring an-
tenna (pictured in Figure 3.6) in conjunction with the SiGe sampler. Dur-
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Figure 3.5: Low cost receiver - SiGe sampler.
ing data collection the antenna had full view of the open sky with up to
10 satellites with clear LOS. The data was then post-processed using the
software-defined-receiver (SDR) for both scalar and PIA vector tracking.
After processing the collected data, the acquisition module of our SDR was
able to acquire 9 of the 10 satellites in view. Then the data was processed
using the scalar tracking loop and navigation module. The scalar tracking
results were then used to initialize the PIA vector tracking loop.
When compared with scalar tracking results, the PIA vector tracking loop
is expected to more accurately predict the code and carrier frequencies needed
to track the signal, and as a result we obtain more accurate PVT solutions.
Results over a 50 second time span are shown in Figures 3.7-3.15. Figures
3.7-3.9 show the code frequency difference from the GPS code frequency
(1.023e6 MHz). From these figures, we can clearly observe the benefits of
the PIA vector tracking algorithm. The PIA results are far less noisy than the
scalar results due to the reduced uncertainty through fixed position feedback.
Figures 3.10-3.12 show the Doppler frequencies for the first 3 channels. From
the figures, we can see that the code and carrier frequencies calculated in the
PIA vector tracking loop are more accurate and precise than the frequencies
from the scalar counterparts.
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Figure 3.6: Fixed reference antenna with full access to the open sky.
Figure 3.7: Code frequency results from PRN 2.
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Figure 3.8: Code frequency results from PRN 5.
Figure 3.9: Code frequency results from PRN 15.
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Figure 3.10: Code frequency results from PRN 2.
Figure 3.11: Code frequency results from PRN 5.
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Figure 3.12: Code frequency results from PRN 15.
3.5.1 Noise Tolerance and Anti-Jamming Performance
To determine the noise tolerance and anti-jamming performance of the PIA
vector tracking algorithm, we purposely added 1-10 dB of simulated Gaussian
noise to the raw GPS signal and processed the resulting data. Figures 3.13-
3.15 show the time error results for varying levels of added noise. With no
added noise, the maximum time errors for the scalar results were close to 45
ns, whereas the time errors for the PIA results were around 10 ns.
Scalar tracking was able to produce decodable navigation bits up until we
increased the noise past 4 dB. However, with every dB of additional noise,
the number of channels that experienced a loss-of-lock increased. At 4 dB of
additional noise, the scalar tracking loop was only able to lock onto 4 satellites
while the original data could lock onto all 9. The time errors also increased as
the noise increased: scalar results showed close to 60 ns of maximum errors
and PIA results showed maximum errors of 13 ns.
The PIA vector tracking loop continued operating until we increased the
noise past 9 dB, at which point the maximum time errors were close to 20
ns.
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Figure 3.13: Time errors with no added noise.
Figure 3.14: Time errors with 4 dB of added noise.
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Figure 3.15: Time errors with 9 dB of added noise.
3.5.2 Meaconing Attack Simulation
The PIA vector tracking algorithm is designed to function with the known
true position as the reference point. In a meaconing attack, also known as
the record-and-replay attack, the GPS signal is first received by the attacker
and then broadcast at a higher signal-to-noise ratio than the signals received
from the satellites, causing the GPS receivers to lock onto the meaconed
signal. A traditional scalar tracking loop would continue to operate during
a meaconing attack; however, the PVT solution calculated would be equal
to the PVT solution of the attacker, plus a delay, thus providing wrong and
misleading timing information. Figure 3.16 shows the results of a meaconing
attack simulation. Due to the fixed-position nature of the PIA vector tracking
loop, the algorithm fails to converge as soon as the meaconing attack begins.
Therefore, our proposed PIA vector tracking is able to successfully detect
the meaconing attack.
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Figure 3.16: Time errors during a simulated meaconing attack with a 200m
separation between the spoofer and the PMU GPS receiver.
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CHAPTER 4
MULTI-RECEIVER
POSITION-INFORMATION-AIDED
VECTOR TRACKING
4.1 Concepts of Multi-Receiver PIA Vector Tracking
To meet the goals set in Chapter 2, we further propose the multi-receiver
position-information-aided vector tracking loop which collaboratively pro-
cesses the signals from multiple receivers which are connected by a common
time source. This is an extension of the single-receiver PIA vector tracking
loop that was proposed and implemented in a previous paper [33]. In this
countermeasure, we deploy multiple receivers in close vicinity synchronized
to a common clock as shown in Figure 4.1. By tracking each receiver in a
multi-receiver PIA vector tracking loop, we will show that every threat can
be either reduced (jamming) or detected (spoofing and receiver errors) by
our countermeasure.
In traditional GPS receivers, scalar tracking loops are used to track GPS
signals from each satellite in view. Each satellite’s tracking loop operates
independently and the results from the processed data are used to decode
the satellite ephemeris data and calculate the navigation solution. In our
multi-receiver PIA vector tracking loop, the receiver’s navigation solution is
set as the states of a Kalman filter, allowing information from all satellites
to be shared by combining signal tracking and position/velocity estimation
into one algorithm.
There are several aspects of our multi-receiver architecture that can be
leveraged when designing spoofing detection algorithms. First, every receiver
is static, which allows us to predict the expected code and carrier elements
for all receivers by using the known baseline and the signal from a single
receiver. The expected elements can then be compared with the actual mea-
surements to detect inconsistencies. Secondly, each receiver will be connected
by a common clock and therefore the data collected by each receiver should
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Figure 4.1: Multi-receiver architecture.
produce the same clock bias and clock drift. Finally, since the receivers are
in close proximity to each other, we can compare their decoded navigation
data as well as that of external sources.
By tracking the multi-receiver signals in a single algorithm, we can pre-
cisely calculate the clock solution and absolute GPS time while greatly in-
creasing receiver resistance to jamming through redundancy. While single
receiver PIA vector tracking algorithms have been shown to be capable of
detecting meaconing attacks, multi-receiver PIA vector tracking can be used
to detect and combat data-level spoofing and meaconing attacks. Addition-
ally, multi-receiver processing can help in detecting receiver errors by cross
checking the navigation message for consistency.
4.2 Threat Detection Capabilities
In the case of a single PMU GPS receiver, in order to avoid detection a
spoofer will likely attempt to maximize the clock error while minimizing
the position error. This can be done in data-level spoofing by modifying the
ephemeris parameters such that the receiver sees each in-view satellite shifted
by a certain distance along the line-of-sight vector (Figure 4.2). If done
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Figure 4.2: Spoofing attack designed to shift calculated satellite positions in
such a way that the position solution remains the same but the clock bias is
offset.
properly, both spoofing attacks can remain undetected by a single PMU GPS
receiver. However, by deploying several clock synchronized GPS receivers in
close proximity to create our multi-receiver architecture, we argue that every
type of threat can be alleviated or detected.
In the case of a spoofing attack with a single attacker, there are three
possibilities to consider: (1) none of the receivers are spoofed, (2) a partial
number of receivers are being spoofed, and (3) all of the receivers are being
spoofed. Since the majority of power system substations are fairly small
(approximately 20m by 20m) and the receivers are restricted to this area, we
can assume that either none (1) or all (3) of the receivers are spoofed.
If all of the receivers are subject to the spoofing attack, the position solu-
tions for all receivers will be identical, causing significant errors to build up
in the position-information-aided algorithms, and thus the attack can be de-
tected. The only way to successfully spoof the multi-receiver architecture is
to spoof each receiver in the network using multiple spoofers with carefully
tuned transmit power to only spoof a single receiver. Each spoofer would
be required to be time-synchronized to simultaneously adjust the perceived
satellite positions or pseudoranges to manipulate the clock solution. While
this spoofing attack is possible, it is highly unlikely that such a complex
attack could be employed without severely compromised physical security.
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Figure 4.3: Multi-receiver PIA vector tracking loop.
4.3 Architecture and Flow
The structure of the multi-receiver PIA vector tracking loop is shown in
Figure 4.3. In multi-receiver PIA vector tracking, information from the nav-
igation filter and the known true positions is fed back into the tracking loop
and used to control the numerically controlled oscillator (NCO). As a result
the channels share information with one another and channels with weak
signal-to-noise ratios can be aided through the use of a common static re-
ceiver’s position, velocity, and clock bias.
In comparison to our multi-receiver PIA vector tracking approach, tradi-
tional scalar tracking processes each channel independently, and there is no
feedback of information between the navigation filter and the tracking loops.
As such, scalar tracking neglects to take into account the relations between
satellites and the user positions and velocities. By leveraging this informa-
tion in our multi-receiver PIA vector tracking algorithm, the search space is
narrowed considerably in the (x,y,z) dimensions.
Similarly to the single-receiver PIA vector tracking loop, the multi-receiver
PIA vector tracking loop is meant to be used in conjunction with the existing
scalar loops rather than as a replacement. At a specific time epoch, several
scalar tracking loop values are extracted and used to initialize the multi-
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receiver PIA tracking loop. Since the multi-receiver PIA vector tracking is
loosely dependent on these initial values, we choose to initialize our tracking
loop after the scalar loop has gained a strong fix on the signal.
After initialization, the multi-receiver PIA vector tracking loop generates
early, late, and prompt code replicas with the NCO for each of the receivers
using LOS projections from receivers to the satellites. The satellite ephemeris
is assumed to be known from the scalar initialization of the tracking loop,
which is then used to generate a satellite constellation at a specific time
epoch. Using the geometry and change in geometry of the satellites to re-
ceivers, we can predict the Doppler and phase terms for the NCO. The code
replicas are then used to create correlations with the signal from the GPS
front ends, which are then used generate the code and carrier discriminators.
The discriminators from each channel contain the code and carrier errors,
which are then projected onto the LOS vectors and used to generate the
Kalman filter measurement matrix. The Kalman filter then estimates the
new navigation solution and creates a prediction for the next time epoch,
and since we know the true positions of the GPS receivers, we correct the
prediction and create a closed feedback loop using the corrected predictions.
While the basic idea behind the multi-receiver PIA vector tracking algo-
rithm is similar to the single-receiver version, there are a few key differences
which we will now discuss. The first major difference is the structure of the
state transition matrix in the Kalman filter, and the second major differ-
ence is the receiver clock estimation. For single receiver vector tracking, the
states of the Kalman filter were chosen to be the ECEF position, ECEF ve-
locity, clock bias, and clock drift. For multiple receivers that are connected
to a common clock, the states become N×ECEF position, N×ECEF veloc-
ity, clock bias, and clock drift, where N is the number of receivers in the
receiver-clock network. The receiver elements of the state transition matrix
are then given by:
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Ai,k =

1 0 0 ∆T 0 0
0 1 0 0 ∆T 0
0 0 1 0 0 ∆T
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

(4.1)

xi,k
yi,k
zi,k
vx,i,k
vy,i,k
vz,i,k

(4.2)
where i indicates the different receivers, ∆T is the time step between update
cycles, and k represents the kth epoch. For each receiver’s Ai, the next
predicted positions are given by a linear combination of the previous position
and velocity. Since the receivers in the network are stationary and the time
step between update cycles is relatively short, the velocity can be modeled
as a constant. Then the state transition matrix when N = 4 is given by:
Fk =

A1,k 0 0 0 0 0
0 A2,k 0 0 0 0
0 0 A3,k 0 0 0
0 0 0 A4,k 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 ∆T
0 0 0 0 0 1

(4.3)
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
X1,k
X2,k
X3,k
X4,k
tb
td

(4.4)
Then the discrete process equation can be written as:
Xk+1 = Fk+1Xk +Wk (4.5)
where Wk is the process noise matrix.
The key concept behind the multi-receiver PIA vector tracking is that
by leveraging the known positions and velocities of the receivers, we can
better predict the terms in our tracking loop. In order to obtain the known
locations, we can either utilize external ground truth mechanisms or simply
average GPS navigation solutions over an extended period. Once the true
positions and velocities of each of the receivers are known, we can correct
our Kalman filter position and velocity estimates.
While the clock bias and clock drift in the above equations are modeled as
common terms for all receivers, there is always slight clock difference between
receivers. Even though we use a single common clock to synchronize the
receivers, due to differences in cable length, connector delays, and internal
receiver clocks, the clock solutions for each of the receivers will be slightly
different. In order to use the common clock model, we manually tune each
receiver’s clock bias by a certain constant offset:
tb,i,k = t
∗
b,i,k + ai (4.6)
where t∗ is the uncorrected clock term and ai is the clock correction term
which can be obtained through extended observation of clock differences in
scalar tracking.
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4.4 Experimental Setup and Results
In field experiments, the goal is to emulate real world scenarios as closely
as possible. Given that the majority of networked PMUs are located within
power system substations, we chose our hardware such that the results col-
lected would be applicable to every substation with access to the open sky.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the countermeasure presented in this thesis,
we deployed four USRPs connected to a common chip-scale atomic clock
(CSAC) as shown in Figure 4.4. Each USRP is connected to an active GNSS
antenna powered by onboard 3.3V bias tees. As mentioned previously, the
majority of power system substations are not very large, around 20 m by
20 m. Since we want our receiver-clock network to be contained within the
confines of the substation, but not so close that the errors are correlated, we
chose to separate the antennas using 10 m long coaxial cables (Figure 4.5).
The purpose of the CSAC as the common time source instead of a less
stable alternative is two-fold. First, by using the CSAC we can expect the
time solutions of our receivers to be very stable, which is essential for reliable
PMU measurements. Second, in the event of temporary GPS unavailability
the CSAC can potentially be used as a temporary timing source.
There are also several reasons we chose the USRPs instead of an off-the-
shelf alternative. First we needed receivers that could output the raw GPS
signals rather than post-processed navigation data. Secondly, the receivers
needed to accept an external common clock source. And finally, we needed
a receiver with flexible bandwidths and center frequency settings. Out of
all the receivers we considered, only the USRP N210 fulfilled all of these
requirements.
Using the USRPs, we collected GPS signals at 2 MHz sampling frequency.
During data collection, the receivers had a clear view of the open sky, up to
8 satellites with clear LOS and good DOP.
After collecting data using our multi-receiver set-up, we processed the sig-
nals using the Python SDR using scalar tracking, single-receiver PIA vector
tracking, and multi-receiver PIA vector tracking. We then added noise to
the GPS signals and simulated several spoofing scenarios to show that our
algorithm can be used to mitigate or detect the attack. Even though a couple
receivers could acquire up to 8 satellites, we only performed tracking using
the 6 satellites acquired by all 4 receivers. Figure 4.6 shows the clock error
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Figure 4.4: Hardware set up. CSAC is shown circled in red and the USRPs
circled in green.
Figure 4.5: The antennas are placed at an approximately 10 m radius.
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Figure 4.6: Time errors under open sky conditions.
results for scalar, PIA vector tracking, and multi-receiver PIA vector tracking
under open sky conditions. From these results, we can see that by leveraging
the known position, the PIA vector tracking reduces the clock errors when
compared to scalar tracking, and multi-receiver PIA vector tracking again
reduces the clock errors even further.
4.4.1 Performance of Anti-Jamming and Noise Tolerance
To determine the anti-jamming and noise tolerance capabilities of the multi-
receiver PIA vector tracking algorithm, we added Gaussian noise at 1 dB
increments and processed the full dataset using all 3 tracking methods. As
the noise increased, each tracking method’s clock errors increased with scalar
trackings being the most drastic as shown in Figure 4.7.
After the noise was increased past 4 dB, the number of channels that could
remain locked during tracking fell below 4, which was consistent with our pre-
vious findings using the MATLAB SDR. Single-receiver PIA vector tracking
could track the signal until we increased the noise past 8 dB (Figure 4.8), and
multi-receiver PIA vector tracking continued operating until we increased the
noise past 11 dB. From Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.9, we can see that even at
11 dB of additional noise, the clock error of the multi-receiver PIA vector
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Figure 4.7: Time errors when 4 dB of additional noise is added.
tracking rivaled that of scalar tracking under open sky conditions. Since for
every 3dB loss, the signal strength received is roughly halved, we can see
that the multi-receiver PIA vector tracking algorithm is very robust against
jamming and environmental noise. Table 4.1 lists the peak clock errors for
each of the tracking methods as the added noise is increased.
Added Noise and Peak Errors
Tracking Method 0 dB 4 dB 8 dB 11 dB
Scalar Tracking 7 ns 20 ns
PIA Vector Tracking 7 ns 10 ns 15 ns
Multi-Receiver PIA 1.5 ns 2 ns 3 ns 7 ns
Vector Tracking
Table 4.1: Peak clock error for each of the tracking methods as the added
noise is increased.
4.4.2 Spoofing Attack Simulations
The threat of spoofing attacks is arguably the biggest impediment to the
use of PMUs to control the power grid. Fortunately, the vast majority of
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Figure 4.8: Time errors when 8 dB of additional noise is added. Scalar
tracking has stopped working.
Figure 4.9: Time errors when 11 dB of additional noise is added. Scalar
and single-receiver PIA vector tracking have both stopped tracking.
42
Figure 4.10: Time errors during a simulated meaconing attack with a 100
m separation between the spoofer and the PMU GPS receivers.
possible spoofing attacks have several common elements which the multi-
receiver PIA vector tracking architecture is designed to combat. By placing
multiple receivers in close proximity (within the 20 m by 20 m area) we can
assume that the spoofing signal is either received by all receivers or by none.
During a meaconing attack, legitimate GPS signals are first received by the
spoofer and then broadcast towards the victim receivers at a higher power
than the signals from the GPS satellites. When this attack is directed at
a receiver running a standard scalar tracking algorithm, the victim receiver
will calculate the same PVT solution as the attacker with an additional
delay, thus causing the receiver to output incorrect timing information. Since
the multi-receiver PIA vector tracking algorithm is dependent on the true
positions and velocities, the difference between the known position/velocity
and the spoofed signals position/velocity causes significant errors, leading to
the failure of the multi-receiver PIA vector tracking loop as shown in Figure
4.10. Thus, the meaconing attack can be detected.
As discussed previously, for a data-level spoofing attack, a spoofer could
modify the ephemeris parameters of the signals in such a way that the po-
sition solution calculated by the victim receivers remains the same but the
timing solution would be incorrect. Figure 4.11 shows the results of our
data-level spoofing simulation. Once the spoofing attack began, the errors in
the Kalman filter quickly accumulated, ultimately resulting in the failure of
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Figure 4.11: Time errors during a simulated data-level spoofing attack.
the multi-receiver PIA vector tracking loop. By simply observing the clock
error, we can see that prior to the failure of the tracking loop the clock er-
rors drastically increased from the previous open sky errors. This increase in
error can potentially be used as an additional spoofing detection metric.
Therefore our proposed multi-receiver PIA vector tracking algorithm is
able to successfully detect meaconing and data-level spoofing attacks.
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CHAPTER 5
REAL-TIME DIGITAL SIMULATOR FOR
POWER SYSTEMS
This chapter will discuss the tests that we performed with the real-time
digital simulator, the results of the tests, and the implications of the results.
5.1 Testing Environment
A power grid is comprised of thousands of power generators, transmission
lines, and distribution centers. Power generators are often interconnected
for improved reliability and economic benefits. By interconnecting power
suppliers, energy can be purchased from multiple sources and customers can
draw power from generators in different regions in order to ensure reliable
power. For example, one region may be producing cheap hydro power during
high water seasons, but in low water seasons, another area may be producing
cheaper power through wind, allowing both regions to access cheaper energy
sources from one another during different times of the year. Neighboring
generators help others to maintain the overall system frequency and also
help manage tie transfers between generator regions.
In order to demonstrate the impacts of a spoofed GPS signal on a PMU
we chose to use Kundur’s four-machine two-area power system case. The
basic structure of the case is shown in Figure 5.1 and the system contains
11 buses, four generators, and two areas. Kundur’s case is commonly used
in power simulations for studies on dynamic stability, power interexchange,
and oscillation damping. In this case, we simplify our problem into two areas
with four generators and two loads. The ideal case for this system is when
each area’s generator generates just enough power to supply its respective
load, thus eliminating transmission losses. Over-generation of power is also
undesirable as it leads to economic losses. Therefore, in order to ensure
reliable power supply for the two areas, we interconnect them so that the
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Figure 5.1: Two-area Kundur power system case.
generation responsibility is distributed among the four generators.
However, in order to ensure interconnected compatibility between two ar-
eas, the phase angle difference between them must not exceed a certain reg-
ulatory amount. This value is closely monitored by power system controllers
and incorrect or falsified values could lead to disastrous results.
5.2 Equipment and Software Setup
The hardware used to implement this test consisted the RTDS shown pre-
viously in Figure 2.3, a function generator, a GPS receiver, and a physical
PMU; the equipment was then connected as shown in Figure 5.2. The equip-
ment was connected in this way ensure that under the unspoofed scenario,
both the physical and virtual PMU (generated by the RTDS) would be syn-
chronized to the same timing signal.
The RTDS test case was implemented using RSCAD shown in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3 sections different blocks in the RSCAD test case together in a
more intuitive manner. Each blue block represents a generator with its re-
spective power stabilizers, excitation systems, and governors. The brown
blocks represent short transmission lines designed to provide power to the
load contained by the red blocks. The loads in this case could represent two
cities separated by some distance which are then connected by transmission
lines in the green block. We also inserted a fault scenario, where one of the
loads could be shorted to ground - which would be equivalent to having a
city-wide blackout. In this test case, we set up the virtual and physical PMUs
to collect measurements at the load (cities) of each of the two areas.
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Figure 5.2: Equipment physical set-up. The timing solution from the GPS
receiver is used as an input to the physical PMU and the signal generator.
The signal generator then generates a synchronized timing signal which is
fed into the virtual PMU. The two PMUs are then used to measure the
phasor elements of the two areas.
Figure 5.3: Kundur’s four-machine two-area case implemented in RSCAD.
Each blue block represents a generator with its respective power stabilizers,
excitation systems, and governors. The brown blocks represent short
transmission lines designed to provide power to the load contained by the
red blocks. The loads in this case could represent two cities separated by
some distance which are then connected by transmission lines in the green
block.
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Figure 5.4: Synchronized timing pulses. The blue signal is the timing signal
from the GPS receiver and the yellow is the synchronized timing pulse
generated by the signal generator. Time-scale is 40 µs.
5.3 Experimental Results
The purpose of this experiment is to demonstrate how a spoofed PMU could
be used to lead a control system to falsely assume that another area is out of
sync, which could lead to unnecessary overcompensation from one or more of
the generators, causing grid instability. In order to show this, we produced
slightly unsynchronized clock solutions and fed the value into the virtual
PMU and observed the system response over the span of several minutes.
In the unspoofed case, the timing signals for the two PMUs are shown in
Figure 5.4, and Figure 5.5 shows an enlarged version of the same signals.
Since the times noted by the PMUs are generated based on the rising edge
of the pulse signal, both signals produce the same timing solution. In both
cases, we trigger the fault scenario to determine the response of the system.
In order to simulate a spoofing attack, we slowly unsynchronize the timing
signals as shown in Figures 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8. The final difference in the two
timing signals was roughly 4 ms.
After running the tests for both the spoofed and unspoofed case, we then
analyzed the data collected by the two PMUs. This section presents the plots
for the voltage magnitude, voltage phase, and phase difference between the
two PMUs.
Figure 5.9 shows the voltage response in the system under standard oper-
ating conditions (without GPS spoofing) and Figure 5.10 enlarges the system
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Figure 5.5: An expanded view of the timing pulses. Time-scale is 1 µs.
Figure 5.6: Simulated spoofing attack resulting in unsynchronized timing
signals. Time-scale is 2 ms.
response to the triggering of the fault scenario. From these two figures, we
can see that the system quickly recovers back into steady state in the span
of a couple seconds.
Figure 5.11 shows the voltage phase response of the two PMUs and Figure
5.12 shows the phase difference between the two PMUs. The information
contained in Figure 5.12 is what we are mainly interested in since the phase
difference between the two areas is crucial for maintaining generator syn-
chronization. From this figure, we can see that even when the fault scenario
is triggered, the phase difference between the two PMUs never exceeds ±4
degrees.
For the spoofed case, we repeated the test while using the spoofed timing
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Figure 5.7: The timing signals are moved further apart. Time-scale is 2 ms.
Figure 5.8: There is a 4 ms discrepancy between the real and simulated
timing signals. Time-scale is 2 ms.
in the virtual PMU. Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14 show the voltage magnitude
and phase of the two PMUs. Over the 8 minute time-span of the experiment,
we were able to bring the phase difference (shown in Figure 5.15) between the
two PMUs up to 140 degrees. We can also see in this figure that the impact
of the fault is magnified by the phase difference. If only a small phase dif-
ference is needed, an attacker could potentially increase the perceived phase
difference between the two PMUs a certain amount and then initiate a fault
in the grid causing severe fluctuations in the phase difference measurements.
As the demand for energy grows, PMUs will be increasingly used for control
purposes to reduce stability margins and increase distribution capabilities.
The most basic PMU control simply checks the difference between the phase
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Figure 5.9: Voltage magnitude of the unspoofed case. The fault causes the
magnitude to briefly drop down to 95 kV but the system quickly returns to
steady-state.
180 182 184 186 188 190 192 194 196 198 200
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
Voltage Magnitude
Time (s)
Vo
lta
ge
 (k
V)
 
 
Area 1 PMU
Area 2 PMU
Figure 5.10: An enlarged view of the fault response in the voltage
magnitude.
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Figure 5.11: Voltage phase of the unspoofed case. The two areas are well
synchronized.
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Figure 5.12: Phase difference during the unspoofed case. The fault causes a
phase difference of ±4 degrees.
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Figure 5.13: Voltage magnitude of the spoofed case. The fault causes the
magnitude to briefly drop down to 40 kV which is significantly more drastic
than the unspoofed case.
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Figure 5.14: Voltage phase of the spoofed case. We can see the two areas
slowly becoming increasingly unsynchronized.
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Figure 5.15: Phase difference during the spoofed case. The phase difference
drastically increases the longer the spoofing attack is in place.
angles of two PMUs. If the phase angle difference exceeds a certain value,
the respective generators will be tripped to prevent grid instabilities.
From the results shown in this chapter, we can see how disastrous a spoofed
timing signal can be on the power grid. If the PMUs in the network were
used as feedback sensors in a generator control system, an attacker could lead
the generator to believe that the system was unstable; and the generator, in
the process of adjusting its outputs, could be tripped. If properly planned,
several tripped generators have the potential to cause severe grid instabilities,
leading to wide-area cascading blackouts.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Security and reliability of PMU measurements are vital to the development
of power systems. Currently, PMUs are mainly used for grid monitoring.
As PMU usage continues to grow, automatic grid control via PMU measure-
ments will become increasingly common. In order to ensure the integrity of
GPS-based timing for PMUs, we proposed and implemented the PIA and
multi-receiver PIA vector tracking loops. We have discussed the underly-
ing concepts, modeled and implemented the proposed tracking loops in a
software-defined-receiver, and conducted field experiments to evaluate the
performance of the algorithms.
The field experiments showed that by utilizing the static nature of the
GPS receivers used in PMUs, we are able to reduce the search space of the
vector tracking loops and improve the accuracy of time solutions generated by
the static receivers. We have demonstrated that the PIA and multi-receiver
PIA vector tracking loops improve the robustness against interference and
jamming, have the ability to detect various spoofing attacks, and also increase
the accuracy of the timing solutions.
We also conducted several experiments using the RTDS and found that by
attacking a PMU’s timing source, we could induce significant phase difference
between two PMUs’ measurements. Since phase difference between two areas
is often used as an indication of fault or potential instabilities, an attacker
could lead the system to believe that its current power generation is either
insufficient or saturated; and in the process of correcting for the believed
deficiency, the system could trip the generators or activate other unnecessary
protection mechanisms. If the GPS timing used in the PMUs were generated
utilizing our proposed tracking algorithms, the timing solutions could be
protected from the spoofing attack.
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